Istihsan as a Principle of Sharia: A Special Study of Juristic Schools
استحسان بطورِ اصلِ شرع: فقہی مسالک کا خصوصی مطالعہ
Keywords:
Istihsan, Islamic Legal Theory, Hanafi School, Maliki School, Shafi‘I School, Hanbali School, Qiyas, Maslahah, Custom, Legal ReasoningAbstract
This study explores istihsan as an important juristic principle in Islamic legal theory, with special reference to the four Sunni schools of law. It particularly examines the Hanafi conception of istihsan as a structured method of legal preference through which an apparent analogy may be set aside in favor of a stronger proof, custom, necessity, or public interest. The article also investigates the positions of the Maliki, Shafi‘i, and Hanbali schools, highlighting their areas of agreement and disagreement regarding the authority, scope, and limits of istihsan. The study argues that istihsan, when grounded in valid legal evidence and the higher objectives of the Sharī‘ah, is not an arbitrary personal preference but a disciplined juristic mechanism that secures justice, ease, and social relevance in legal reasoning.
